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AntarcticaThe coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic is caused by the severe acute respiratory syndrome corona-
virus 2 (SARS-CoV-2). This pathogen has spread rapidly across the world, causing high numbers of deaths and
significant social and economic impacts. SARS-CoV-2 is a novel coronavirus with a suggested zoonotic origin
with the potential for cross-species transmission among animals. Antarctica can be considered the only continent
free of SARS-CoV-2. Therefore, concerns have been expressed regarding the potential human introduction of this
virus to the continent through the activities of research or tourism tominimise the effects on human health, and
the potential for virus transmission to Antarcticwildlife.We assess the reverse-zoonotic transmission risk to Ant-
arctic wildlife by considering the available information on host susceptibility, dynamics of the infection in
humans, and contact interactions between humans and Antarctic wildlife. The environmental conditions inni, V. Morandini, et al., Risk assessment of SARS-CoV-2 in Antarctic wildlife, Science of the Total En-
v.2020.143352




TransmissionAntarctica seem to be favourable for the virus stability. Indoor spaces such as those at research stations, research
vessels or tourist cruise ships could allow for more transmission among humans and depending on their move-
ments between different locations the virus could be spread across the continent. Among Antarctic wildlife pre-
vious in silico analyses suggested that cetaceans are at greater risk of infection whereas seals and birds appear to
be at a low infection risk. However, caution needed until further research is carried out and consequently, the
precautionary principle should be applied. Field researchers handling animals are identified as the human
group posing the highest risk of transmission to animals while tourists and other personnel pose a significant
risk only when in close proximity (< 5 m) to Antarctic fauna. We highlight measures to reduce the risk as well
as identify of knowledge gaps related to this issue.
© 2020 Published by Elsevier B.V.1. Introduction
The coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, caused by the
severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) emerged
in the Hubei Province of China in late 2019. This virus has spread rapidly
to most parts of the world, having caused over one million confirmed
deaths as of October 2020, posing grave concerns to all aspects of
human life, with significant social and economic impacts (World Health
Organization, 2020). SARS-CoV-2 is a novel coronavirus closely related
to coronaviruses found in bats and pangolins (Lu et al., 2020b; Zhang
et al., 2020), suggesting a zoonotic origin (Andersen et al., 2020).
Coronaviruses have a long history of cross-species transmission, whereby
all members of the seven identified coronaviruses that infect humans are
suspected to have zoonotic origins (Corman et al., 2018). In addition to
coronavirus spread from animals to humans, there are numerous records
of cross-species transmission of coronaviruses among non-human ani-
mals (Hemida et al., 2017; Zhou et al., 2018). In humans, transmission
of SARS-CoV-2 is thought to occur predominantly via direct contact
with airborne droplets projected when coughing, sneezing or talking, as
well as indirectly through aerosols or contact with fomites (Allen and
Marr, 2020; Cai et al., 2020; Liu et al., 2020; Ong et al., 2020). Additionally,
concerns have arisen that humans can act as a transmission source towild
or domestic animal species (reverse zoonosis) and non-human hosts
could serve as a source of infection for humans (zoonosis) (Franklin and
Bevins, 2020).
Prior tomid-March 2020, Antarcticawas the only continent presumed
to be free of SARS-CoV-2. However, at the end of the 2019–2020 tourist
season in March, at least one SARS-CoV-2 positive tourist visited several
sites along the Antarctic Peninsula (Ing et al., 2020). This highly mobile
event highlights the concerns regarding the potential human introduction
of this virus to the continent through research activities or tourism. The
potential effects of SARS-CoV-2 in Antarctica include those related pri-
marily to human health and the risks of potential transmission of the
virus to Antarctic wildlife. In this paper, we assess the potential risk of
SARS-CoV-2 reverse-zoonotic transmission (i.e. fromhumans to other an-
imals) to Antarctic vertebrates. We considered information available on
host susceptibility and infection dynamics in humans, and risks of the
possible contact interactions between humans and Antarctic wildlife as
these elements are necessary (Plowright et al., 2017) for the emergence
of SARS-CoV-2 in the Antarctic ecosystem.We identify important knowl-
edge gaps and, recommend that the precautionary principle be applied to
limit the transmission of SARS-CoV-2 to Antarctic fauna and propose
measures to reduce such risk.
2. SARS-CoV-2 host range and evidenceof cross-species transmission
Coronaviruses are enveloped single-stranded RNA viruses. The
family Coronaviridae is composed of two subfamilies, Letovirinae
with one genus (Alphaletovirus) and Orthocoronavirinae with four
genera (Alphacoronavirus, Betacoronavirus, Gammacoronavirus and
Deltacoronavirus). Alphacoronaviruses and betacoronaviuses are
common in mammals, including humans, domestic animals and
bats (Chan et al., 2013). These viruses cause a range of diseases2
including upper and lower respiratory tract disease, gastroenteritis,
and central nervous system infections. Zoonotic transmission, or
spill-over from a wild or domestic animal host to humans, is a fre-
quent occurrence (Morse et al., 2012) including SARS-CoV-1 from
bats and palm civets (Li et al., 2005), MERS-CoV from camels (with
an ultimate origin in bats) (Lau et al., 2013) andHCoV-OC43, which is be-
lieved to have its origin in cattle (Vijgen et al., 2005). Birds are the main
reservoirs for gammacoronaviruses and deltacoronaviruses, with most
of these viruses causing no disease in their wild bird hosts. Avian corona-
virus, aGammacoronavirus, was the first described coronavirus (ca. 1931)
and the infections it causes in poultry have a large socioeconomic impact.
Gammacoronaviruses and deltacoronaviruses have mammalian hosts
with Beluga whale coronavirus SW1 (Gammacoronavirus) infecting
cetaceans (Mihindukulasuriya et al., 2008) and Coronavirus HKU15
(Deltacoronavirus) infecting swine and mammals in wet markets (Woo
et al., 2012). There are no known avian hosts for alphacoronaviruses or
betacoronaviruses.
SARS-CoV-2 is a betacoronavirus closely related to coronaviruses
found in bats and pangolins (Lu et al., 2020a, 2020b; Zhang et al.,
2020), and it appears to have a wide vertebrate host range. The virus
has been detected in companion animals such as cats and dogs living
with infected owners (American Veterinary Medical Association,
2020) and has caused large outbreaks with lethal disease in farmed
minks (Oreshkova et al., 2020). Experimental studies have shown that
the virus can infect and replicate efficiently in cats, captive ferrets and
hamsters, with transmission to conspecifics (Kim et al., 2020; Shi
et al., 2020; Chan et al., 2020a, 2020b). In contrast, the virus replicates
poorly in dogs, and experimental infection attempts in pigs, chickens
and ducks have been unsuccessful, suggesting that these species may
not be susceptible (Shi et al., 2020).
Host receptor binding to the angiotensin-converting enzyme 2
(ACE2) cell surface receptor is a critical determinant of the host range
of some coronaviruses. In these viruses the receptor binding ismediated
by the spike protein which is a glycoprotein expressed on their surface.
Host susceptibility to the virus based on in silico simulations of the bind-
ing affinity of the viral spike protein to ACE2 receptors suggests that
mammals including primates, cattle, hamsters, cetaceans, cats, dogs,
bats, pigs, ferrets, civets and pangolins could present high susceptibility
to SARS-CoV-2 (Damas et al., 2020; Luan et al., 2020; Piplani et al.,
2020). In contrast, the in silico analysis of ACE2 receptors of a range of
fish, amphibian, reptile and bird species predicted a very low risk for
SARS-CoV-2 infection (Damas et al., 2020). Interestingly, in silico analy-
sis also predicted a very low risk for SARS-CoV-2 infection of several bat
and pangolin species, and contradictory results have been reported (Qiu
et al., 2020), highlighting the limitations of in silico predictions. Addi-
tional factors that can contribute to the host range of coronaviruses,
such as interactions between host proteases and the virus spike protein,
remain poorly studied in non-model species (Millet and Whittaker,
2015). These additional factors could potentially explain the discrep-
ancy between in silico analyses and experimental infection results.
Overall, the host range of SARS-CoV-2 is yet to be determined, but the
risk of infection of wild species, in particular mammals, appears to be
potentially significant.
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3.1. Human-to-human transmission and risk of introduction
As of October 2020, no SARS-CoV-2 infection has been reported at
any Antarctic research station. Considering that approximately 5000 re-
search and support personnel and a growing number of tourists from
around the world (close to 55,000 tourists on land in 2018/2019;
iaato.org 2020) visit Antarctica annually (Hughes et al., 2019), the risk
of humans introducing SARS-CoV-2 to Antarctica is non-negligible. It
has been described severalways of transmission of SARS-CoV-2 through
respiratory droplets, aerosols or through fomites (Allen andMarr, 2020;
Cai et al., 2020; Liu et al., 2020; Ong et al., 2020). Epidemiological data
suggest that indoor conditions are particularly favourable to transmis-
sion (Qian et al., 2020). Scientific and tourism activities in the Antarctic
often involve close indoor confinement (vessels and research stations)
for extended periods of time. Therefore, upon introduction, the risk of
human-to-human transmission of the virus could be high under these
circumstances, as illustrated by high transmission on cruise ships in
the early phase of the pandemic (Xu et al., 2020).
Detection of SARS-CoV-2 is thefirst crucial step for effective infection
control, however, its relatively long incubation period, up to two weeks
(Lauer et al., 2020), and variability in symptoms are major obstacles for
mitigating viral transmission (Li et al., 2020). Viral shedding by humans
infected with SARS-CoV-2 starts prior to the appearance of clinical
symptoms and is estimated to occur for several weeks after infection
(Liu et al., 2020; Lu et al., 2020a, 2020b). Viral RNA has been detected
in respiratory samples for more than three weeks after the onset of
symptoms (He et al., 2020) and for six weeks in faecal samples (Wu
et al., 2020). However, it is unclear whether these persistent viral parti-
cles are infectious or remnant. Considering these infection dynamics and
the frequent movements of tourists, scientists and support staff within
Antarctica, the spread of the virus to different sites is a plausible scenario.
3.2. Virus stability and infectivity in the Antarctic environment
SARS-CoV-2 is relatively stable in aerosols, with aerosolized particles
remaining potentially viable for several hours (van Doremalen et al.,
2020).Moreover, SARS-CoV-2 can also remain viable on a variety ofma-
terials, with viable virus being detectable for up to 72 h post-exposure
on plastics and steel surfaces in classical indoor conditions (van
Doremalen et al., 2020;Matson et al., 2020). Temperature and humidity
are crucial for the viability, infectivity and transmission of enveloped vi-
ruses (Yang and Marr, 2012). SARS-CoV-2 stability is increased in cold
conditions (Chin et al., 2020; Matson et al., 2020) and experiments con-
ducted on other coronaviruses have demonstrated the higher stability
of coronaviruses at extreme (low or high) levels of humidity (Ijaz
et al., 1985; Casanova et al., 2010). The potential effect of climatic condi-
tions on transmission dynamics from predictions based onmodelling of
SARS-CoV-2 epidemiological data and endemic human coronavirus data
suggest that climatic conditions could play an evenmore important role
during the post-epidemic phase (Baker et al., 2020). Together, these re-
sults suggest that the Antarctic continent could provide suitable envi-
ronmental conditions for the presence and transmission of the virus.
Areas where research activities and tourist operations are concen-
trated, such as the South Shetland Islands, northern Antarctic Peninsula
and Victoria Land (Convey and Peck, 2019), likely present the highest
risk for viral introduction and transmission. While environmental con-
ditions could have a limited impact on human-to-human transmission
in the current pandemic phase (Baker et al., 2020), the unique climatic
conditions in Antarctica could increase transmission risk, notably from
humans to animals as most contacts occur outdoors. Cold conditions
can potentially facilitate fomite transmission, especially via scientific
equipment used by several people or in contact with both humans
and other animals. However, aerosol transmission would be less likely
outdoors due to the common occurrence of strong winds.3
3.3. Transmission to Antarctic wildlife
Contact between humans and wildlife in Antarctica occurs during
research activities or tourist visitation and, to a lesser extent, during un-
expected encounters associated with operational and logistical activi-
ties or fishing. As wildlife research often involves handling animals to
collect biological samples (e.g. blood or swabs), attaching devices (e.g.
satellite transmitters or behavioural loggers) or recording biometry
data (e.g. body weight), there are various opportunities for Antarctic
wildlife species to be exposed to respiratory droplets or other secretions
from SARS-CoV-2 infected people. Resolution 3 on General Guidelines
for Visitors to the Antarctic at the XXXIV ATCM (Antarctic Treaty Con-
sultative Meeting) recommends a minimum distance of 5 m from ani-
mals; however, there are occasions when animals approach humans
spontaneously. In some other instances, unintentional interaction with
wildlife is possible while conducting other activities; species that
purposely approach humans while defending territories (e.g. skuas
protecting their chicks) or in an attempt to scavenge or steal food (e.g.
skuas and sheathbills on land, albatrosses at sea) could be at a greater
risk of exposure. Therefore, wildlife researchers, research support staff
and tourists present potential sources of infection for Antarctic wildlife.
Reverse zoonotic transmission of SARS-CoV-2 could also potentially
occur via indirect contact, notably via faecal transmission (Franklin and
Bevins, 2020). This transmission route has already been suggested for
other infectious agents such as enteric bacteria infecting Antarctic scav-
engers (Cerdà-Cuéllar et al., 2019). Detection of high levels of SARS-
CoV-2 RNA in wastewater in urban areas suggests high faecal shedding
by infected individuals (Ahmed et al., 2020), and viable viral particles
have previously been isolated from faecal samples (Xiao et al., 2020), al-
though these studies were unable to detect infectious viral particles in
faeces. While faecal-oral and faecal-respiratory transmission played a
critical role in SARS-CoV-1 epidemiology (McKinney et al., 2006), the
role played by these routes of transmission for SARS-CoV-2 remains un-
clear (Yeo et al., 2020). Faecal transmission of SARS-CoV-2 in many
countries is probably partially limited by stringent wastewater treat-
ment protocols (Foladori et al., 2020; Lesimple et al., 2020). However,
thismay not be the case for wastewater treatment facilities on Antarctic
stations. Under the Environmental Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty (the
Madrid Protocol, 1991) Annex III, the provisions for wastewater man-
agement are very general (Smith and Riddle, 2009). Thus a variety of
wastewater treatments are in use, ranging from a lack of any form of
treatment facility at stations with an average of fewer than 30 persons
during the summer (37% of the permanent stations and 69% of the sum-
mer stations; Gröndahl et al., 2009) to advanced treatment systems
generating final effluent quality that far exceeds secondary treatment
standards (Law et al., 2006). Consequences of such differential treat-
ment of wastewater is reflected by the introduction of enteric bacteria
and antimicrobial resistant bacteria to the environment adjacent to re-
search stations (Hernandez and González-Acuña, 2016).
Wildlife migration presents another potential route of transmission
of SARS-CoV-2with risks of migratory species encountering the virus in
regions on their migration paths. This includes species that (a) breed in
the Antarctic region and visit the coast or the coastal waters of South
America, Africa, Australia or NewZealand and/or inhabited Subantarctic
islands such as Antarctic terns (Sterna vittata; Tree and Klages, 2004),
giant petrels (Macronectes spp.; de Souza Petersen et al., 2017), south-
ern elephant seals (Mirounga leonina; Hindell et al., 2016) and hump-
back whales (Megaptera novaeangliae; Zerbini et al., 2006), (b) breed
in Antarctica and overwinter in the northern hemisphere, such as
South Polar skuas (Stercorarius maccormicki; Weimerskirch et al.,
2015), or (c) breed in other regions and overwinter in Antarctica, such
as Arctic terns (Sterna paradisaea; Fijn et al., 2013).
An additional potential risk for transmission is the chain of human-
to-animal-to-animal, where a susceptible species that acquires the
virus from humans could then serve as a source of infection for other
species of Antarctic fauna. Through this transmission chain species
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be indirectly exposed to the virus via a species such as pinnipeds that
could have occasional interaction with infected researchers or tourists.
However, this last route of transmission seems highly implausible, as
it would require at least two successive cross-species transmission
events.
3.4. Coronaviruses of birds and marine mammals
Birds are the main host for gammacoronaviruses and
deltacoronaviruses, with five and seven described species, respectively
(Fig. 1). There are no known alphacoronaviruses or betacoronaviruses
for which birds are the confirmed hosts. In the gammacoronaviruses,
the species Avian coronavirus, which comprises infectious bronchitis
virus, Turkey coronavirus and Canada Goose coronavirus, are the only
viral species associated with disease (Papineau et al., 2019). There are
no reports of disease outcomes inwild birds caused byDuck coronavirus
2714, which is the species of gammacoronavirus most commonly de-
tected in wild birds (e.g. Muradrasoli et al., 2010). There are no reports
of disease associated with infections by deltacoronanviruses in avianFig. 1.Viral species relevant to this risk assessment. (A) Coronavirus species detected inmarine
the genera. Hosts are indicated by an image and connected by lines to the viruses fromwhich th
that the same (putative) virus species has been found in both hosts. Ratified viral species are pr
by M. Wille. (B) Viral species detected in Antarctic birds and mammals. We have not included
cluded; we have excluded viral species recorded on sub-antarctic islands such as South Geor
image and connected by lines to the viruses fromwhich they have been detected. Ratified viral
transmitted by ticks are indicated by a tick silhouette. Picobirnaviridae, indicated by an asterisk
viral reads were found in Chinstrap Penguins, the Antarctic hosts of tick viruses are not confirm
quarie Island. Ronne Virus and Piguzov virus, members of the Phenuvidiae are indicatedwith a
penguin colonies in two independent studies. All images were taken by M. Wille.
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species, with the exception of a disease event caused by Quail coronavi-
rus (Domanska-Blicharz et al., 2019), a member of the Coronavirus
HKU15 species. Interestingly, a putative species of deltacoronavirus
has been detected in healthy Antarctic penguins (Wille et al., 2020).
This viral species does not cause disease, has a broad geographic distri-
bution and has been detected in a wide range of avian hosts, including
falcons, bustards, pigeons, gulls and shorebirds (Wille et al., 2019b).
In marine mammals, two related gammacoronaviruses have
been found in cetaceans: Beluga whale coronavirus and the closely
related Bottlenose dolphin coronavirus (Schütze, 2016). Despite
being gammacoronaviruses, these cetacean viruses differ from
the gammacoronaviruses found in birds and are grouped in a dif-
ferent subgenus, consequently it seems unlikely to represent a re-
cent cross-species transmission event. Also, it is unclear whether
these cetacean viruses cause disease in their hosts. On the other
hand, the record of an alphacoronavirus in harbor seals (Phoca
vitulina) could be considered more concerning because it suggests
that seals might be susceptible to mammalian coronaviruses. The
Harbor seal coronavirus falls in a clade comprising Ferret coronavi-
rus, Feline coronavirus, Canine coronavirus and Transmissiblemammals and seabirds, globally. A filled circle refers to a virus, and is coloured according to
ey have been detected. A virus (filled circle) is connected tomore than one library indicates
esented in italics, putative viral species are presented in regular text. Silhouettes generated
viral species detected by serology. Only viral species detected in Antarctica have been in-
gia Island and Macquarie Island. A filled circle refers to a virus. Hosts are indicated by an
species are presented in italics, putative viral species are presented in regular text. Viruses
have previously been associatedwith vertebrate hosts. Other than Taggert Virus, in which
ed. Gadgets Gully virus has been detected in ticks in Antarctica and King Penguins inMac-
# and their avian hosts have not been confirmed despite being detected in ticks adjacent to
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tection of a virus species specific to seals, or the detection of
cross-species spill-over, remains to be determined.
3.5. Virus presence in Antarctic wildlife
Information about the presence of viruses in Antarctic wildlife is
scarce and fragmented (Barbosa and Palacios, 2009; Barbosa et al.,
2015; Grimaldi et al., 2015; Grimaldi et al., 2018; Smeele et al., 2018).
A major constraint contributing to this dearth of knowledge is that
many of the early studies were limited to investigating only known vi-
ruses,most of whichwere associatedwith humans or domestic animals.
However, the development of novel diagnostic tools has allowed the
discovery of several new viruses in Antarctic wildlife over the last de-
cade (Tables S1 and S2; Fig. 1). Despite coronaviruses being known to
circulate in wildlife populations there has been no dedicated investiga-
tion of coronaviruses in Antarctic fauna. This is limiting becausewithout
dedicated studies it is not possible to determine which viral species cir-
culate; which animals are potential reservoirs;what is the prevalence or
burden of these viruses in animal hosts; and what is the genetic diver-
sity of these viral species. This baseline information is essential to
improve our understanding of the consequences of the potential intro-
duction of SARS-CoV-2 to Antarctica and to assess the risk of recombina-
tion between local coronaviruses and SARS-CoV-2 (Su et al., 2016). In
this context, new research to investigate the presence of coronavirus
in Antarctic wildlife is urgently needed.
3.6. Susceptibility of Antarctic wildlife to infection by SARS-CoV-2
The lack of information about susceptibility to SARS-CoV-2 is a key
knowledge gap for a risk assessment of the potential impacts of this
virus for Antarctic wildlife. In the absence of this information, the in
silico modelling results from Damas et al. (2020) combined with the
current understanding of coronavirus host range can provide some
early insight. Based on a comparative and structural analysis of the
ACE2 receptor of 72 avian species, the Adélie penguin (Pygoscelis
adeliae) and the emperor penguin (Aptenodytes forsteri) which inhabit
Antarctic regions, showed “very low” binding affinity of the ACE2 recep-
tor to the SARS-CoV-2 spike protein, as did all other studied bird species
(Damas et al., 2020). This suggests that other Antarctic birds are likely to
have low susceptibility to SARS-CoV-2 infection, which is further sup-
ported by the absence of infection in chickens and ducks experimentally
inoculated with SARS-CoV-2 (Shi et al., 2020). Specifically, viral RNA
wasnot detected in any swabs collected from these virus-inoculated an-
imals or from naïve contact animals, and all animals were seronegative
for SARS-CoV-2 when tested by ELISA at 14 days post-infection (Shi
et al., 2020). This is perhaps not surprising given that birds are not res-
ervoirs for betacoronaviruses. Based on this indirect information, trans-
mission of SARS-CoV-2 to Antarctic birds seems unlikely. Nevertheless,
further research on Antarctic birds is warranted to confirm this.
While none of the six pinniped species in the modelling study by
Damas et al. (2020) occur in the Antarctic region, the pinnipeds evaluated
had “very low” ACE2 binding affinity, suggesting that Antarctic pinnipeds
could also have low susceptibility to SARS-CoV-2 infection. In contrast, 12
of the 14 cetacean species in that study received a “high” score for the
binding affinity of their ACE2 receptor, including the Antarctic minke
whale (Balaenoptera bonaerensis) and killer whale (Orcinus orca)
(Damas et al., 2020). A third cetacean species occurring in Antarctic wa-
ters, the sperm whale (Physeter macrocephalus), showed “medium”
ACE2 binding affinity (Damas et al., 2020). Based on these findings, ceta-
ceans appear to have the highest risk of SARS-CoV-2 infection amongAnt-
arctic wildlife. However, the results from Damas et al. (2020) should be
interpreted with caution, because some vertebrate species such as bats,
which are known hosts of coronaviruses closely related to SARS-CoV-2,
or ferrets, which have demonstrated susceptibility to experimental infec-
tion, also scored in the “low” or “very low” categories. This suggests that5
ACE2 receptor binding affinity might not be the only factor determining
species susceptibility to SARS-CoV-2 and that alternative receptors
could also be involved (Damas et al., 2020; Sigrist et al., 2020). It is there-
fore clear that further studies are necessary to evaluate the susceptibility
of Antarctic mammals to coronaviruses, including SARS-CoV-2.
Knowledge of SARS-CoV-2 pathogenicity in non-human animals in
general is limited. However, symptomatic infections, eventually resulting
in death, have been recorded in experimentally infected cats, and in
farmed mink in contact with infected humans (Oreshkova et al., 2020;
Shi et al., 2020). For these reasons, the risk posed by SARS-CoV-2 infection
to Antarctic wildlife health cannot be disregarded.
3.7. Risk assessment conclusions and perspectives
Globallywild animal and human interactions are increasing as natural
areas are increasingly disrupted by anthropogenic activities (Johnson
et al., 2020 and references therein). Increased interactions between wild
animals and humans greatly facilitates the potential of pathogen spill-
over and the emergence of zoonotic pathogens. Recognising this in-
creased risk of cross-species transmission, there is a clear imperative for
carefulmonitoring of humanactivities inAntarctica and for implementing
mitigation measures. This can be achieved by the development and im-
plementation of a set of clear and standardised biosecurity protocols to
minimise potential pathogen transfer. These could include: quarantine
periods for visitors to Antarctica, increased screening to identify patho-
gens, increased serological screening to detect the presence of antibodies
against high risk pathogen families, andmanaging humanmovements to
and within Antarctica.
With respect to the current pandemic of SARS-CoV-2 and based on
the available knowledge, we can conclude that the environmental con-
ditions in Antarctica are likely favourable for virus stability and thus in-
fectivity. Transmission among humans could occur locally at research
stations, onboard research vessels or tourist cruise ships as has already
been documented (Ing et al., 2020; Xu et al., 2020), and at broader geo-
graphical scales depending on the movements of tourists and scientific
research endeavours between different locations. Field researchers han-
dling animals should be considered as posing the highest risk of trans-
mission to animals due to direct and close contact with wildlife, while
tourists and other personnel pose a significant risk only if in close prox-
imity (< 5 m) to Antarctic fauna. Although Antarctic wildlife appears to
be at low risk of infectionwhen the predictions based on the structure of
the virus receptors found in these animals is considered, these findings
should be interpreted with caution until further data on transmission
risk to Antarctic species can be obtained. Therefore, the precautionary
principle should be applied, and measures should be taken to reduce
the risk of introduction and transmission of the virus to Antarctic wild-
life. In addition, it has been suggested that SARS-CoV-2 could become
endemic to human populations (Kissler et al., 2020), implying that the
risk of introduction of the virus to Antarctic ecosystems and its potential
impact on the local fauna, could remainwell after the epidemic phase. In
the future, based on available knowledge and vaccine availability, miti-
gation measures would have to be revised.
4. Proposed mitigation measures
Based on the current knowledge on SARS-CoV-2, we propose a set of
guidelines and additional measures to reduce the risk of SARS-CoV-2
and other infectious pathogens being introduced to Antarctic fauna. Con-
sidering the precautionary principle and this risk assessment, the follow-
ing guidelines are recommended in addition to the biosecurity measures
and regulations aimed at limiting animal disturbance already in place:
4.1. Antarctic research facilities staff (crew, scientific and technical personnel)
1. It is recommended that all individuals participating in research
facilities (crew, scientific and technical personnel) be tested for
A. Barbosa, A. Varsani, V. Morandini et al. Science of the Total Environment xxx (xxxx) xxxactive virus infection by RT-qPCR or any validated rapid SARS-CoV-
2 test prior to departure for Antarctica (at aminimum) in parallel to
quarantine procedures for two weeks (preferable).
2. As a general measure, any individual demonstrating any disease
symptoms and specifically those compatible with COVID-19 should
self-isolate, be tested for SARS-CoV-2 presence if possible, and not
be permitted close contact with wildlife or humans.
3. Individuals in the same station, field camp or vessel with a risk of
local infection transmission due to close contact with a person
showing symptoms compatible with COVID-19 should be excluded
from close contact with wildlife.
4. Due to the possibility of SARS-CoV-2 positive, asymptomatic individ-
uals, extreme caution should be taken when handling animals to
avoid the risk of transmission. Appropriate face masks (PFF-2 is rec-
ommended) must be worn whenever in close contact with animals.
Additionally, eye protection, gloves (latex, nitrile or rubber) and spe-
cific clothing (i.e. overalls) shouldbeusedwheneverpossible (consid-
ering the use of cold weather clothing). Hand washing with soap or
hydroalcoholic gel solution is highly recommended before and after
animal handling. No animals should be handled in enclosed spaces.
5. To avoid transmission through fomites, outer clothing should be
disinfected using soap and warm water every day prior to and
after work with animals and in between colonies (if researchers
visit more than one colony per day).
6. Field equipment disinfection procedures should be carried out prior
to and after animal handling, especially when working in different
areas or colonies. Wherever possible, it is recommended that field/
sampling equipment not be shared between locations if appropriate
disinfection cannot be achieved. The use of 70% ethanol, vaporized
hydrogen peroxide, dry heat or UV lamps is recommended.
7. Tominimise animal exposure to equipment/potential fomite trans-
mission, field equipment should not be left unattended and should
be kept far from wildlife when not in use.
8. Scientific equipment deployed in the field should be disinfected be-
fore deployment and after handling.
9. Individuals should adhere to strict recommendations for personal
hygiene at all times (frequent hand washing for the appropriate
time and regular disinfection).
10. Limit, except where considered essential for scientific and logistical
purposes, movement of individuals between stations, field camps
or research vessels, and restrict contact between tourists and all
personnel at stations or research vessels.
For additional information for national program operators, which are
independent of this recommendations, see SARS-CoV-2/COVID-19 infor-
mation for Antarctic Operations; https://www.comnap.aq/members/
covid-19-information/.
4.2. Tourists (including researchers/staff accompanying tourists)
1. It is recommended that all individuals participating in a tourist expe-
dition be tested for active virus infection by RT-qPCR or any validated
rapid SARS-CoV-2 test at least prior to departure for Antarctica and
maintain quarantine procedures for two weeks.
2. Tourists showing symptoms compatible with COVID-19 disease
must self-isolate, be tested for SARS-CoV-2 presence if possible and
be excluded from close contact with wildlife or humans.
3. Tourists in the same vessel with risk of infection due to the presence
of an infected person (close contacts), should not be permitted to go
anywhere near wildlife.
4. Tourists and guides should always keep a minimum distance of 5 m
from wildlife, in addition to strict adherence to IAATO guidelines
given a greater distance may be required for different animal species
and age cohorts. If an animal spontaneously approaches an individ-
ual or group, tourists and guides should retreat to ensure this mini-
mum distance is rigorously adhered to.6
5. To minimise animal exposure to equipment/potential fomite trans-
mission, field equipment should not be left unattended and should
be kept far from wildlife.
6. All tourists and staff should refrain from sitting on or lying on bare
ground or rocks or leaving any equipment on bare ground or rocks
close to animal activity (within 10 m of nests, haul out sites or
pathways).
7. Tourists and guides to adhere to strict recommendations for personal
hygiene at all times (frequent handwashing for the appropriate time
and regular disinfection).
There guidelines are proposed based on the knowledge summarized
above andmitigationmeasure protocols available in the literature (Chin
et al., 2020; Fischer et al., 2020).
4.3. Additional measures
1. Surveillance of the presence of SARS-CoV-2 in wastewater from
cruise ships, research stations and research vessels is recommended.
2. As a reminder, human waste from camps or field parties is to be re-
moved from the field and returned to research stations or vessels
for wastewater management.
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